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1Summary
As restrictions on foreign funding for civil society continue to multiply around 
the world, Western public and private funders committed to supporting civil 
society development are diversifying and deepening their responses. Yet, as a 
result of continued internal divisions in outlook and approach, the interna-
tional aid community is still struggling to define broader, collective approaches 
that match the depth and breadth of the problem.
Restrictions on External Funding for Civil Society Intensify and Spread 
Continued closing space. Just in the past two years, China, India, and 
Russia, along with many smaller countries—such as Cambodia, Hungary, and 
Uganda—spanning all ideological, economic, and cultural lines, are stepping 
up efforts to block foreign support for domestic civil society organizations.
Broader repression. Attacks on foreign funding for civil society are often 
the leading edge of wider crackdowns on civil society. Power holders justify 
broader sets of restrictive measures like limitations on freedom of assembly 
using the anti-foreign-intervention line. 
Multiple causes. Attributing the closing space problem mainly to the authori-
tarian surge around the world overlooks the diversity of the causes. Rising 
nationalism, counterterrorism policies, a wider questioning of Western power, 
clashes between economic interests and civic activism, and other factors also 
spur the phenomenon. 
How Funders Are Responding 
Changing how they operate. Public and private funders are stepping up 
the sharing of information about closing space problems among themselves, 
conducting more risk analysis, revising communication strategies, operating 
remotely in more places, and bolstering efforts to work directly with local 
funding partners.
Changing what they do. Funders are scaling back potentially politically sensi-
tive activities in some countries and increasing emergency funds and protective 
assistance for besieged civic activists. They are also supporting national and 
regional NGO platforms and new resource centers, and exploring alternative 
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ways to support civil society, such as by shifting attention to social enterprises 
and social movements. 
Pushing back. Having accumulated considerable experience backing domes-
tic and international campaigns to persuade or pressure closing space govern-
ments not to enact restrictive NGO laws and other barriers to civil society 
support, funders are now attempting to extract practical lessons from these 
campaigns and increase their efficacy. 
Struggling to unify. Governments hostile to foreign civil society aid are 
undercutting coordinated responses to their restrictive actions by exploiting 
enduring divisions of outlook and approach within the international assistance 
community, including between public and private funders, U.S. and European 
funders, and developmental and political funders. Conflicting policy interests, 
especially relating to counterterrorism, have weakened the response of Western 
governments in some countries.
3Introduction
In early 2014, Saskia Brechenmacher and I published a report, Closing Space: 
Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire, calling attention to the mush-
rooming trend of governments blocking external actors from aiding civil soci-
ety within their territories. The phenomenon was not new. In 2006, I had pub-
lished an article in Foreign Affairs on the emergence of “The Backlash Against 
Democracy Promotion,” and Carl Gershman and Michael Allen warned in the 
Journal of Democracy about “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”1 But the 
closing space problem had not at that earlier time reached a tipping point of 
either ubiquity or severity. By 2014, it had. Yet many aid organizations were 
only just starting to look for ways to address the issue. 
Since the publication of the 2014 report, the problem has only intensified. 
Closing space actions continue to multiply, both in major countries like China, 
India, and Russia, as well as in many smaller ones, such as Cambodia, Hungary, 
and Uganda. A greater number and wider range of funders 
are directly affected. In this context, how is the assistance 
community responding to what a growing array of aid prac-
titioners now see as a major threat to Western support for 
civil society development in many parts of the world?
This paper seeks to answer this question. It looks at how 
Western funders are responding, examining changes they 
are making in how they operate and what they do to support civil society abroad, 
as well as actions they are taking to try to limit specific closing space measures. 
The aid community is clearly advancing in its understanding of the problem 
and in many specific lines of response, ranging from better communications 
strategies and risk analysis to a greater emphasis on joining up with local fund-
ing partners and offering emergency funds and protective assistance. Yet it is still 
struggling to define broader, coordinated approaches that match the depth and 
breadth of the issues at stake, approaches that would embody a forceful com-
mitment to the core principles and values involved and a wide consensus among 
diverse funders about the need to act. This is the result both of hesitation on the 
part of many public and private funders to engage at the policy level on this issue 
as well as of continued divisions in outlook and approach among aid providers 
that cut against the forging of effective broader responses.
The aid community is still struggling to define 
coordinated approaches that match the 
depth and breadth of the issues at stake.
4 | The Closing Space Challenge: How Are Funders Responding?
Closing Continues
In the past two years, efforts by governments around the world to limit foreign 
funding for civil society have continued to intensify and spread.2 The two most 
important non-Western powers, Russia and China, remain in a driving role, 
further hardening their already restrictive stances. Their actions are the result 
of the nationalist, anti-Western outlook of their governments. They also reflect 
fears of unrest, freshly stoked by the 2014 protests in Ukraine and Hong Kong, 
which Russia and China view, respectively, as having been fomented by foreign 
interests.3 India has also moved in a negative direction. And following the lead 
of these three major powers, numerous smaller countries, in multiple regions, 
have also taken closing space measures. Moreover, closing space issues are sur-
facing in Western democracies as well.
Russia 
The already problematic situation for civil society in Russia has deteriorated 
still further since the passage of the 2012 “foreign agent” law, especially since 
the fall in 2014 of the government led by Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, the 
Russian annexation of Crimea, and the souring of Russo-Western relations. In 
June 2014, amendments were added to the foreign agent law authorizing the 
Ministry of Justice to register independent groups as foreign agents without 
their consent. By October 2015, the list of such groups had grown to include 
over 95 organizations.4 In addition, the Russian government passed a new law 
in May 2015 against so-called “undesirable” nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). This law enables the Prosecutor General’s office to ban the activities 
of foreign or international NGOs deemed to be undermining “state security,” 
“national defense,” or “constitutional order” and to fine or jail Russian activ-
ists and civil society groups for maintaining any ties with such organizations.5 
In July, Russia’s upper house of parliament published a list of twelve foreign 
NGOs, including Freedom House, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the National Democratic 
Institute, the Open Society Foundations, and the International Republican 
Institute, asking that the Prosecutor General’s office, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, and the Justice Ministry scrutinize these organizations’ operations.6 
The Prosecutor General’s office issued its first ban under this law, accusing 
the National Endowment for Democracy of undermining “the foundations of 
Russia’s constitutional order, its defense capability and security.”7 Later that 
month, the MacArthur Foundation announced that it would close its office in 
Moscow, commenting that these new laws “make it all but impossible” for inter-
national foundations to operate in Russia, and the Mott Foundation announced 
it was ending grantmaking in Russia.8 Following passage of a law limiting for-
eign ownership of media outlets in 2014, Russian legislators introduced a bill 
in October 2015 that would require news organizations to disclose most types 
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of foreign funding they receive to the government media watchdog, seemingly 
modeled after the foreign agent law under which NGOs have been regulated.9
China
Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, the Chinese government has 
been imposing tighter restrictions on Chinese civil society and carrying out a 
smear campaign against foreign funding of NGOs. Various state organs have 
demonized NGOs, particularly foreign ones, with statements such as “non-
governmental organizations are the soft tentacles of Western countries dis-
playing the will of their nation.”10 The newly established Chinese National 
Security Commission, a centralized agency to advise and 
coordinate national security matters within the Chinese 
Communist Party leadership, as well as some provincial 
governments began in mid-2014 investigating a number of 
foreign-funded NGOs.11 
The government released a draft national NGO law, 
known formally as the Foreign NGO Management Law, 
in May 2015. The law would place onerous restrictions on 
the registration, reception of funding, and oversight of foreign NGOs. While 
the law technically would not ban foreign funding, it would require foreign 
organizations that plan to fund domestic NGOs to register in China prior to 
disbursing funds, raising significant barriers to entry for most international 
funders.12 Moreover, a number of provisions in the bill suggest that the govern-
ment views the issue as a national security imperative. The bill charges public 
security bureaus rather than civil affairs bureaus with registration and oversight 
of foreign NGOs. One clause in the bill would require that NGOs “not endan-
ger China’s national unity, security, or ethnic unity; must not harm China’s 
national interests, society’s public interest, or other groups’ and citizens’ lawful 
rights; and must not violate public order and customs.”13 The proposed law 
may yet be softened before passage, but it seems likely that the environment in 
China for foreign-funded NGOs will continue to be difficult for the foresee-
able future.
India
A third major non-Western power, India, has also been further limiting space 
for foreign supporters of civil society. A leaked Indian Intelligence Bureau 
report soon after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to office in 2014 
warned that “a significant number of Indian NGOs (funded by some donors 
based in US, UK, Germany and Netherlands)” had been “using people-cen-
tric issues to create an environment, which lends itself to stalling development 
projects.”14 In 2015, the government placed the Ford Foundation on a “prior 
permission list” of organizations that must obtain prior governmental approval 
before disbursing grants. Ostensibly, this was done for (unspecified) national 
It seems likely that the environment in China 
for foreign-funded NGOs will continue to 
be difficult for the foreseeable future.
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security reasons though many observers posited that it was due to the founda-
tion’s support of a particular human rights activist seen by the prime minister 
as a political critic.15 The government has added other Western organizations to 
this list due to alleged violations of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 
(FCRA), including the Danish International Development Agency, Catholic 
Organization for Relief and Development Aid (Cordaid), Mercy Corps, as 
well as a host of environment groups, such as 350.org, the Sierra Club, and 
Greenpeace India, the latter of which has come under particular scrutiny.16 
The leaked Intelligence Bureau report in particular spot-
lighted Greenpeace International’s funding of Greenpeace 
India and its alleged “massive efforts . . . to take down 
India’s coal-fired power plant and coal mining activity” as 
well as FCRA violations and sought to make an example 
of it, freezing its international bank account, preventing 
its activists from traveling abroad, and eventually banning 
it from receiving overseas funding.17 In the first half of 2015, the government 
canceled the registration of more than 10,000 NGOs, citing administrative 
missteps on their part, such as not filing certain paperwork.18 The government 
is also moving forward with a draft FCRA amendments bill. Although this bill 
simplifies some of the bureaucratic procedures relating to foreign funding, it 
introduces new restrictive elements, among them disallowing NGO activities 
that harm a new broader definition of India’s “economic security” and intrusive 
disclosure requirements.19
Others
Having these three powerful countries—including the world’s most populous 
democracy—setting the pace of increasing restrictions on external support for 
civil society resounds loudly around the world. This is true especially because 
all three of these countries have set forward their restrictive lines very publicly, 
defending them in broad normative terms as a necessary response to Western 
political meddling. Following these “industry leaders” in closing space, numer-
ous other countries have also recently taken negative steps. Some examples:
• Angola issued a presidential decree in March 2015 regulating NGOs that 
introduces extensive registration requirements and prevents organizations 
from accepting funding from foreign entities that engage in undefined 
“activities contrary to the principles defended by the Angolan people or 
national sovereign bodies.”20 
• Bangladesh passed the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation 
Bill, 2014 in December of that year, placing stringent limits on foreign 
funding for NGOs and outright bans on all “foreign donations for elec-
toral candidates and government officials. Given the broad definition of 
Concerns about foreign funding of civil 
society have increasingly made themselves 
felt in Western democracies as well. 
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“foreign donations” in the legislation, it could be interpreted to prohibit 
training and other nonfinancial assistance.21 
• Cambodia enacted a new NGO law in July 2015 that, among other provi-
sions, bans unregistered organizations while vaguely defining what groups 
are required to register, gives the Ministry of Interior full control over reg-
istration with no due process for organizations rejected or deregistered, and 
leaves undefined the terms “peace, stability and public order or harm the 
national security, national unity, culture, and traditions of the Cambodian 
national society” for which organizations can be disbanded.22 This law was 
a discouraging setback after an energetic domestic and international cam-
paign in prior years to try to convince the Cambodian government not to 
proceed with an earlier version of it. 
• Hungary lashed out harshly in mid-2014 against Norwegian funding of 
some Hungarian NGOs, accusing recipients, including the Hungarian 
Civil Liberties Union, Transparency International Hungary, and local 
investigative websites, of having “leftist political ties.”23 The government 
audited and raided the offices of Ökotárs, the local partner in charge of 
an NGO fund to which Norway had contributed, a move that a court in 
Budapest later declared unlawful.24 
• Uganda is likely to pass an updated NGO law that would create an NGO 
board with broad and potentially abusive powers in registration, super-
vision, and enforcement of organizations as well as a number of vague 
grounds on which NGOs can be banned.25 Language in the bill states that 
“the rapid growth of Non-Governmental Organisations has led to subver-
sive methods of work and activities.”26
• In addition, the governments of Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, 
Tajikistan, and Vietnam have drafted or are working on legislation that 
further restricts NGO activities.
Concerns about foreign funding of civil society have increasingly made 
themselves felt in Western democracies as well. A 2014 article in the New 
York Times calling attention to funding by foreign governments for U.S. think 
tanks sparked considerable attention in U.S. policy circles.27 The U.S. House 
of Representatives responded by establishing a new requirement that mandates 
witnesses testifying before it report any support that they have received from 
foreign governments related to the subject of their testimony.28 Such scrutiny 
has extended north of the border. Over the past three years, the Canadian 
government has criticized some Canadian NGOs over concerns that they are 
conduits of foreign, particularly U.S., influence. In 2012, after the prime min-
ister expressed concern over foreign money given to opponents of oil pipelines, 
the minister of natural resources went further, accusing “environmental and 
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other radical groups” funded by “foreign special interest groups” of trying “to 
hijack our regulatory system to achieve their radical ideological agenda” and 
“undermine Canada’s national economic interest.”29 The government followed 
up these statements with a series of measures that NGOs feared would send 
a chill over the sector including a Senate investigation into foreign funding, 
new sanctions for NGOs violating the 10 percent budget spending limit on 
“political activities,” and audits of dozens of both environmental and develop-
ment and human rights NGOs to determine whether they were violating the 
“political activities” limit.30
In other Western democracies issues relating to the possible narrowing of 
space for civil society have also arisen, although not with specific connection to 
foreign funding. The Australian government has been critical of environmen-
tal organizations that have raised questions about government-supported min-
ing and natural resource projects. The Federal Council of the governing Liberal 
Party unanimously adopted a nonbinding motion to strip environmental orga-
nizations of their charitable rights in 2014.31 In March 2015, the environment 
committee of the House of Representatives opened an inquiry into whether such 
groups should receive tax-deductible status.32 In the United Kingdom, the pas-
sage in 2014 of the Transparency in Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and 
Trade Union Administration Act, which reduces the threshold of expenditures 
relating to an electoral campaign that UK charities can make prior to an election 
before the expenses must be registered with the Electoral Commission, met with 
criticism by UK NGOs concerned about a possible chilling effect on NGO activ-
ities.33 Maina Kiai, the United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, wrote in the Guardian when the 
bill was in draft: “Although sold as a way to level the electoral playing field, the 
bill actually does little more than shrink the space for citizens – particularly those 
engaged in civil society groups – to express their collective will. And in doing so, 
it threatens to tarnish the United Kingdom’s democracy.”34
Private Pressures
Rising pressures on civic actors are coming not just from governments but in 
some places from private actors as well. Latin America has been an especially 
harsh region for such developments. Numerous Latin American countries have 
seen a rising tide of cases of violence against journalists, environmental and 
land rights activists, and human rights defenders instigated by smuggling orga-
nizations, drug traffickers, corporations, and other private groups, often in col-
laboration with corrupt officials. In Mexico, local police abducted 43 students 
from a teacher’s college en route to a commemoration of a 1968 massacre of 
protesters and turned them over to a local criminal gang to maim and kill 
them.35 In Peru, illegal loggers are prime suspects in the murder of indigenous 
anti-logging campaigner Edwin Chota and three of his colleagues.36 In 2015, 
Global Witness, an international NGO focused on conflict, corruption, and 
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human rights abuses related to natural resource exploitation, released a report 
finding that nearly three-quarters of environmental activists killed in 2014 
occurred in Latin America.37 Similarly, the Committee to Protect Journalists 
has documented the widespread impunity with which journalists are increas-
ingly harassed and murdered in Central and South America. Brazil, Colombia, 
and Mexico are among the eleven worst countries for violence against journal-
ists, alongside the likes of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria.38
Overall Picture 
These recent developments embody crucial features of the closing space 
phenomenon:
• The attacks on foreign funding for civil society are usually, although not 
always, the leading edge of wider crackdowns on civil society. Power hold-
ers justify broader sets of restrictive measures, like generalized limitations 
on freedom of assembly or a campaign against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) activism, using the anti-foreign-intervention line as 
an umbrella rationale. 
• Countries engaging in closing space measures span a wide variety of politi-
cal systems—fully authoritarian, semiauthoritarian, and democratic—and 
cut across essentially all regional, economic, and cultural lines, making the 
reach of the closing space phenomenon extremely wide. 
• Multiple factors drive the issue—the overconfidence of some power hold-
ers, the insecurity of others, rising nationalism, migration flows, clashes 
between economic interests and environmental and rights advocates, a 
questioning of Western power in many places, and much else. Simply see-
ing the closing space problem as the result of a broad authoritarian surge in 
the world overlooks the diversity and complexity of the causes.
• Counterterrorism policies continue to contribute to the problem as well. 
The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and the attendant growing 
fears of “the enemy within” in many different countries fuels efforts to 
restrict cross-border financial flows to nongovernmental organizations and 
the view that civic space is a luxury that countries threatened by terrorism 
cannot afford.
Taken together, all of these elements underline the crucial fact that the clos-
ing space for cross-border assistance to civil society is not a temporary phenom-
enon likely to pass once a few especially troublesome leaders depart the scene. 
It is rooted in structural elements of the international political system that will 
continue to shape the landscape for international democracy and rights sup-
port for the foreseeable future.
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Modifying Methods 
Growing Recognition and Sharing
With the closing space problem continuing to spread and intensify, more 
funders are experiencing problems with their operations in more countries and 
thus becoming more aware of the overall issue. A growing number of funders 
are carrying out internal review processes to examine the problems they have 
encountered and the responses they have taken, and to think through what 
their approach should be. These review processes often include discussions by 
the organizations’ boards of directors and other advisory groups, and some-
times include in-depth reviews of the organizations’ historical experience in 
different countries and consultations with on-the-ground partners.
In parallel with this process of awareness raising within specific assistance 
organizations, efforts to share and accumulate knowledge among funders are 
also growing. A donor working group on cross-border philanthropy was set 
up in March 2014 at the initiative of the Fund for Global Human Rights, 
the Oak Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, and the Sigrid Rausing 
Trust, bringing together more than 40 foundations concerned about closing 
space issues. The group, which is hosted by the Ariadne network and the 
International Human Rights Funders Group, has convened a series of work-
shops, conferences, and online discussions to discuss the closing space prob-
lem and responses to it. In addition to its continued indispensable reporting 
and analysis of legal developments relating to closing space, the International 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law convened in May 2015 a Global Forum dedi-
cated to discussions about civic space among participants from more than 200 
organizations. The 2014 and 2015 State of Civil Society reports by CIVICUS 
have devoted attention to the issue. On several occasions in 2015, including 
in Ireland in May, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon spoke out against 
growing restrictions against civil society groups in many countries. Within 
the U.S. policy community, the White House has held outreach meetings 
with a group of interested nongovernmental organizations to discuss progress 
on the Obama administration’s Stand With Civil Society initiative that was 
launched in September 2013. The Human Rights Initiative of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies has launched a project aimed at deepen-
ing the understanding of the closing space problem and generating policy 
responses.39 Alongside the U.S. government, the Swedish government has 
been the most active government sponsoring awareness-raising and knowl-
edge-sharing work on the closing space problem.
Although information sharing among funders has started to increase, it is 
hampered by an imbalance: almost all funders are keen to know what prob-
lems other organizations are having, yet are hesitant to divulge much informa-
tion regarding their own problems. They worry that sharing specifics of grants 
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that have proved especially sensitive, or the results of conversations they have 
had with government officials about restrictive measures, may jeopardize their 
efforts to resolve problems quietly. Or they feel that the specific work-arounds 
they have achieved for any one problem are particular to that context and not 
worth sharing with others as a general lesson learned. Thus, the demand for 
shared knowledge about closing space experiences tends to exceed the supply. 
Operating More Remotely
From the beginning of the closing space phenomenon, one of the most common 
responses by funders has been shifting away from a direct presence in restrictive 
countries and instead operating remotely—whether that has meant establishing 
an office in a neighboring country to oversee activities relating to the restric-
tive country, shifting relevant operations to a regional office, holding trainings 
or other activities in neighboring countries, or building up virtual methods of 
support, such as online training courses. This trend toward replacing reduced 
in-country presences with remote operations has been increasing during the past 
two years in parallel with the continued worsening of the closing space problem. 
The Russian government’s recent restrictive actions, for example, have prompted 
various organizations to shift to remote operations for work relating to Russia. 
Such measures include the establishment of the Prague Civil 
Society Centre in 2015. The organization supports civil soci-
ety development in Russia and other countries of the former 
Soviet Union, with funding from the Czech, Swedish, and 
U.S. governments, and the Oak and Mott Foundations.40
Deciding whether to close down an office within a 
country that is becoming restrictive is often difficult for 
assistance organizations that still have a choice and have 
not been ordered to leave. It involves an uncertain and 
often fraught calculation about the cost of staying, which 
usually includes risks to personnel and having to operate within narrowed pro-
grammatic boundaries, versus the value of staying. Some organizations, like 
the two largest German political foundations, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and 
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, have a tradition of maintaining long-term in-
country presences. They are understandably loath to give up on their country 
offices, unless it is absolutely necessary. Thus, for example, the Ebert Stiftung 
remains in Ethiopia, despite the highly restrictive environment for democracy 
and human rights support there. It chooses to work directly with the ruling 
party, hoping to support positive change from within the power establishment. 
In contrast, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a newer foundation with less tradi-
tion of very long-term relationships with partner governments, chose to leave 
Ethiopia in 2012 after encountering significant limits on its work there. A 
Böll press release announcing the office closure stated that the organization’s 
This trend toward replacing reduced 
in-country presences with remote operations 
has been increasing during the past 
two years in parallel with the continued 
worsening of the closing space problem. 
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decision to leave Ethiopia should be taken “as a sign of protest against the ongo-
ing restriction of human rights and democratic development in the country.”41
In negotiating with government officials of a country that is closing its 
doors to outside funders, funding groups are experiencing a particular pattern 
regarding the power structures at work: the officials in the ministries with 
which they normally have contact—usually, the foreign ministry and some-
times ministries with a substantive connection with aid programs, such as 
ministries for local development, education, or social services—often encour-
age them to stay. Yet less accessible, less transparent official elements—usually 
in the domestic security and intelligence ministries—are the forces pushing for 
their departure. The more accessible, positive officials often have little influence 
over the workings of the security and intelligence forces, and are at a loss to be 
helpful, even when they wish to be. One upshot of this division is that funder 
efforts to carry out programmatic activities that build good relations with some 
important domestic ministries, as a way to try to inoculate them from being 
closed out of the country, often end up not reaching those government officials 
or ministries that are the core of the problem.
Changing Communications Strategies
Revising communication strategies is a growing response to closing space prob-
lems. This typically involves funders increasing efforts in countries where they 
work to communicate more information about who they are and what they do, 
in the hope of either heading off restrictions or surviving those that have been 
imposed. Heightened communications efforts are especially common among 
private funders, which tend to be less known by people in recipient contexts 
than major governmental funders. Even some very large foundations with long 
records in some countries have discovered when controversies erupt over their 
work that they are much less understood by people in those countries than they 
had thought. As a result, they are making new efforts to prepare and dissemi-
nate informational materials or message campaigns about themselves that are 
interesting and persuasive to local audiences.
While uncontroversial in principle, a decision by a funding organization 
to share more information about itself with the people in the countries where 
it works often presents issues in practice. For example, one German founda-
tion operating in an African country that has become restrictive about for-
eign involvement in civil society has had a debate between its field office in 
that country and its headquarters. The field office wanted to remove the word 
“political” from the organization’s website in that country, but the headquar-
ters argued (and ruled) that the organization should not try to deny its politi-
cal reform focus. In another case, a U.S. foundation has debated internally 
whether it could or should be frank in its informational materials about the 
fact that one of its primary aims is to change political and economic policies in 
the countries where it works. Some organizations that fund human rights work 
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have internally questioned whether they should eschew the human rights label 
and encourage grantees to do the same. The initial instinct of most assistance 
organizations is that the better understood they are in countries where they 
work, the more acceptable their work will be. Yet this optimistic assumption 
quickly runs up against difficulties in countries where xenophobic feelings are 
high (and being actively stirred up by governments) and past experiences with 
foreign actors are problematic.
Most assistance organizations agree with the basic idea of communicating 
more fully about who they are and what they do, at least in general terms. But 
differences and doubts within the assistance community are only increasing 
over whether a useful response to closing space is greater transparency about 
the specifics of programming, such as making public lists of grantee organiza-
tions and amounts of grants. In addition, some funders are discussing inter-
nally whether they should streamline their relationships with grantees at risk, 
to reduce their vulnerability to monitoring by hostile security services, by col-
lecting less detailed information about them, asking grantees to report in less 
detail about what they do, and conducting fewer site visits to grantee organiza-
tions. Some funders try to hold to a commitment to full transparency, while 
others are more willing to shift to be somewhat less transparent for the sake 
of protecting grantees and themselves. Many members of an assistance com-
munity that on the whole favors transparency are gravitating toward a kind 
of “transparency lite” approach—being quite transparent about the specifics 
of their programming in contexts where they are not facing closing space, but 
selectively reducing available program information in restrictive environments.
More Risk Analysis
An unpleasant feeling of having been blindsided is common among assistance 
organizations that have experienced pushback against their work from hostile 
governments. Accordingly, a quiet but growing element of the closing space 
response by funders is expanding the amount of risk analysis they carry out 
before engaging in programming. Such analysis usually includes an overall 
assessment of the environment for assistance work and more specific analysis 
of potential grantees. It also includes attention to the specific language in grant 
proposals and grant agreements, to avoid wording that might be perceived as 
inflammatory if taken out of context.
Although valuable, analysis of pushback risk is difficult because of the unpre-
dictability of power holders’ reactions to different types of programs and the 
reality of rapidly changing political currents in many countries. Redlines are 
often highly unclear until they are crossed, and may depend on the mood of a 
particular official at a particular time. The issues that attract sudden sharp reac-
tions from governments may be ones that touch very specific nationalistic nerves 
in ways almost unforeseeable to outsiders. One Western organization that has 
worked for many years in Indonesia, for example, found itself in trouble recently 
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with the Indonesian government, not because of its political reform work with a 
variety of institutions, but because it sponsored a minor conference that focused 
in part on the political events in Indonesia during 1965.
Funders are paying greater attention to assessing the risk to grantees of 
accepting outside funding and the degree of responsibility that funders have 
for risks that grantees incur as a result of accepting that support. A debate 
exists over this issue within and among various funders, including the U.S. 
government. Some aid practitioners believe that potential recipients are the 
best judges of risk to themselves and that funders committed to promoting 
human rights in repressive contexts should be willing to let recipients decide 
whether they wish to accept foreign funding, even if the risk to them appears 
from the outside to be significant. Others take a more cautious view, holding 
that funders should be not extend funding when they assess the risk as high, 
whatever the views of potential recipients. This issue surfaced with regard to 
beneficiaries (as opposed to direct recipients) of foreign funding in the con-
troversial case that came to light in 2014 of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) giving funds to help establish a microblogging and 
social network service in Cuba, called ZunZuneo. Among other issues the 
case presented (such as the appropriateness of the U.S. aid agency engaging in 
sensitive, under-the-radar democracy-related work in countries with which the 
U.S. government has a hostile relationship), the question arose as to whether 
USAID was at fault for having created a program in which tens of thousands 
of Cubans put themselves at potential risk by taking part in online activity 
sponsored by the U.S. government but which the Cuban participants had no 
way of knowing was U.S. sponsored.
Increasing the Role of Local Funding Partners
Some funders are exploring the possibility of operating more frequently in 
partnership with local philanthropists who can co-fund or co-sponsor pro-
grams. The hope is that the involvement of such partners will decrease sensitiv-
ity about the foreign funding role. This is an attractive idea, yet often difficult 
to put into practice. In many countries where Western assistance operates, 
local philanthropic capacity is weak. And where such capacity exists, it is often 
directed toward charitable activities, not toward the rights- or policy-oriented 
activities that Western aid providers are sponsoring.42 Moreover, if the context 
is fraught regarding foreign funding, local philanthropists are likely to be wary 
of associating directly with Western funders. 
Some Western funders are also giving greater attention to the idea of invest-
ing more extensively in activities designed to encourage local philanthropy 
generally, as a long-term approach to reducing the dependence of domestic civil 
society groups on foreign funding. Although the current problems of closing 
space highlight the value of increasing local philanthropy, it is a topic with its 
own complicated history. Some significant efforts have been undertaken over 
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the past several decades to encourage philanthropy in the developing world, yet 
the still-low level of policy- and rights-oriented philanthropy in such places is 
testament to the very long road that such an approach entails.
Changing What Funders Do
Scaling Back
A common response of essentially all assistance organizations faced with newly 
restrictive environments is to examine what they are doing in those places 
and consider whether they should stop funding certain groups, cease sponsor-
ing certain activities, or otherwise curtail their activities to avoid triggering 
negative reactions. Based on such internal reflections, many organizations have 
scaled back work they believe might be politically sensitive. 
The scaling back includes staying away from issue areas 
that appear to be most sensitive to local power holders; 
not funding particular groups or individuals that irritate 
local sensitivities; stepping up the less political side of civil 
society programming, such as educational or health work; 
and replacing political advocacy programming with service delivery support. 
Usually, these decisions are based on case-by-case judgment calls. Assistance 
organizations are rarely able to establish clear lines that would apply across 
time and across different regions about what sorts of activities are too sensitive. 
Unclear redlines on the part of host governments and the great diversity of pro-
gramming that can occur under any one funding category make establishing 
such guidelines difficult. Thus, the instinct of boards of directors and senior 
managers to respond to closing space problems by establishing clear internal 
rules about what activities their organizations should or should not undertake 
often founders against the variability of closing space actions and contexts. 
When it involves the actual departure of a funder from a country, scaling 
back is quite visible, such as the decisions earlier in 2015 by the MacArthur 
Foundation and the Mott Foundation to cease operations in Russia. Often, 
however, scaling back is hard to see from the outside because it consists of 
quiet, subtle changes in what funders sponsor and the kinds of partners they 
are willing to work with, changes that funding organizations prefer not to 
talk openly about. It is difficult to assess the overall weight of such changes 
across the funding community thus far, beyond the general impression that 
one derives from talking directly to diverse funders that many cases of pro-
grammatic adaptation are occurring, and that as pushback intensifies, scaling 
back is increasing correspondingly.
Many assistance organizations have scaled back 
work they believe might be politically sensitive.
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More Emergency Funds
The funding community is increasing quick-action financial assistance avail-
able to civil society groups that come under attack. Such support helps cover 
costs incurred for hiring legal defense, replacing confiscated equipment, relo-
cating out of the country, and carrying out advocacy or publicity work to call 
attention to specific acts of persecution. Foundations engaged in sensitive 
rights support have for years made at least some such emergency funding avail-
able to grantees in trouble. But reflecting the growing tempo of closing space 
problems, a significant step up in such assistance has occurred in recent years.
An important increase occurred in 2011, when some Western governments and 
major U.S. foundations sponsored the establishment of the Lifeline: Embattled 
Civil Society Organizations Assistance Fund. This fund, managed by the U.S. 
Department of State and implemented by a consortium of seven transnational 
NGOs that work directly with civic activists, operates with an annual budget of 
between $2 million and $3 million. It has made nearly 700 emergency assistance 
grants in its first several years of existence.43 The fund has also supported initia-
tives in six countries with restrictive environments (such as Egypt and Belarus) 
that have brought together in-country civic activists to develop ideas about how 
the donor community can assist them more effectively.
Another major increase in emergency funding is in the works. The European 
Union, through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 
is in the process of establishing a European Union Human Rights Defenders 
Mechanism with an initial budget of 15 million euros. The mechanism will 
combine emergency grants and relocation for human rights defenders in trou-
ble with other types of support such as training on risk prevention, the creation 
of early-warning systems, and domestic and international advocacy for respect 
for human rights defenders.44 A guide prepared in 2014 by the International 
Human Rights Funders Group sets out information about emergency funding 
available from many different parts of the funding community.45
Increasing Protective Assistance
As noted in Closing Space, Western aid providers have established a diverse set 
of programs and initiatives aimed at providing civil society organizations in 
difficult environments with protective technologies to help them survive. These 
assist grantees with encryption methods, off-site data storage, circumventing 
censorship, and other issues arising from efforts by hostile governments to sur-
veil and block their work. A new web platform, Movements.org, for crowd-
sourcing legal assistance and other types of support to human rights defenders 
being persecuted was established in 2014.46 This assistance has expanded as 
pushback has increased. Yet so too have debates within some funding organi-
zations about whether some forms of protective assistance, by wrapping civil 
society aid in elements of opacity or secrecy, may increase host country suspi-
cions about it. 
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Funders have also been bolstering protective assistance by giving in-country 
partners advice and support on becoming fully compliant with local laws and 
regulations regarding NGO operations. Complying with the registration and 
reporting requirements of restrictive NGO laws can be difficult and burden-
some, especially for smaller groups operating outside of the capital city. Some 
funders, such as the U.S. government and the European Union, have stated a 
willingness to fund nongovernmental organizations that do not comply with 
local registration requirements, primarily in circumstances where they believe 
that registration requirements are excessive or arbitrarily enforced to such a 
degree as to constitute a violation of freedom of association for local activists.47 
In Egypt, for example, some aid providers have been willing to provide support 
to Egyptian NGOs that have refused to register under the country’s problem-
atic NGO legal and regulatory framework.
Some funders are exploring how to help in-country partners craft new 
counternarratives that can push back against the destructive narratives that 
governments in many countries are mounting against domestic civil society 
groups and their acceptance of foreign funding. This thinking about alterna-
tive narratives reflects the concern among many civil society funders that many 
recipients of Western civil society assistance have given inadequate attention to 
explaining in persuasive, accessible ways to their own societies what they do 
and why they do it (at the same time, recipients complain that funders have 
neglected this issue and have been unwilling to adequately support the costs of 
more sophisticated communication strategies). 
Efforts to craft these alternative narratives are part of the broader preoccu-
pation in the funding community about Western-funded NGOs being poorly 
rooted in their own societies, and thus easily vulnerable to governmental efforts 
to stir up public sentiment against them. Systematic work on counternarratives 
is only just getting started. Interested organizations are meeting periodically to 
discuss how to make such efforts effective and how to share information about 
counternarratives among civil society groups in different regions.
New Resource Centers
A regional variation on national NGO platforms is the ongoing effort funded 
by USAID and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) to support the establishment of a set of “regional hubs” in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East that will support civil society against clos-
ing space pressures through knowledge provision, research, convening, and 
other means. In 2015, a series of co-design workshops were held in the differ-
ent regions bringing together diverse groups of civil society representatives to 
brainstorm about what forms the hubs might take and what roles they might 
play. The initiative is now moving from the design phase to the incubation 
phase with selected sets of civil society actors in the different regions working 
to come up with specific plans for the establishment of the hubs.48
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Searching for Alternative Ways to Support Civil Society
Faced with rising barriers to traditional methods of civil society aid, funders 
are searching for alternative means to help provide support. Sometimes this 
involves a search for alternative funding sources for the same organizations 
that have already been receiving Western assistance. These efforts range from 
encouraging wealthy persons within poorer countries to become philanthro-
pists to spurring governments to create tax incentives for charitable giving. 
Some aid providers are trying to help NGO partners develop crowdfunding 
and to share experiences of such attempts with NGO sectors.
Quietly, out of fear of giving traditional grantees the impression that they are 
about to be abandoned, some aid groups are considering a broader shift—mov-
ing away from the long-standing pattern of concentrating funding on NGOs 
and instead assisting a wider range of organizations that may fulfill similar 
roles. Some funders have been looking, for example, to work more with social 
enterprises, in the hope that their different legal status will mean that they do 
not fall afoul of restrictive NGO laws and that their business orientation will 
give them a better profile among citizens skeptical of civic do-gooders. One 
major UK foundation, for example, has directly funded some Ethiopian social 
enterprises that carry out work similar to some of the NGO groups that the 
foundation previously funded but is no longer able to due to the government’s 
limits on foreign NGO funding. Various aid organizations are increasingly 
talking about the need to work more with social movements rather than tradi-
tional NGO partners, with the idea that social movements 
may have stronger local roots, as well as less formalized 
organizational forms, which may facilitate giving support 
that gets around restrictions on NGO funding.49
Even before the closing space problem became wide-
spread, the Western aid community was already engaged 
in a critical internal debate over its model of civil society 
funding. The tendency of some civil society support to 
emphasize NGOs that focus on elites, lack strong local 
bases of support, depend on foreign funding, and follow donor-driven rather 
than locally derived agendas has been a common refrain in analyses of civil 
society assistance going back to the 1990s.50 The rise of the closing space prob-
lem has brought this debate to a sharper edge in at least parts of the funding 
community and has prompted renewed reflection and self-criticism (at least 
privately) among aid practitioners who have worked in the civil society space 
for decades. Yet the longevity of this debate highlights the fact that there are 
no easy solutions to the problems of finding local sources of funding and alter-
native operational models. This is not to say that it is impossible to do so and 
that the standard methods of civil society support do not deserve scrutiny and 
possible revitalization. For example, the tendency of most funders to provide 
project support rather than core support to NGOs, making it harder for them 
Various aid organizations are increasingly 
talking about the need to work more 
with social movements rather than 
traditional NGO partners.
Thomas Carothers | 19
to develop organizational strength and more apt to have to conform closely to 
donor agendas, merits rethinking.
Pushing Back Against Restrictive Actions 
In addition to developing alternate ways of operating and possibly funding dif-
ferent types of organizations and initiatives, assistance organizations concerned 
about the closing space problem are responding at the policy level by looking 
for ways to persuade or pressure governments not to take or to reverse closing 
space measures. Such pushback takes different forms, from very targeted com-
plaints to governments about specific problems to broader campaigns against 
restrictive laws and regulations. It also includes policy engagement with the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental body that sets 
standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and 
operational measures relating to the integrity of the international financial sys-
tem—and work with other multilateral institutions.
Problem-Specific Responses
When aid groups find themselves the target of a specific closing space action—
such as harassment of their staff, criticism of their work by a host government, 
or legal or regulatory problems—they usually try to resolve the issue through 
direct contact with the government in question. They may meet with relevant 
host government officials to argue for being allowed to continue their assis-
tance programming, request help from their own foreign ministries to weigh 
in with host government counterparts, or enlist influential third parties to per-
suade governments not to block assistance.
When closing space issues were just starting to multiply around the world, 
the instinct of many funders, especially smaller private foundations and other 
nongovernmental assistance organizations, was often to confine their problem-
solving efforts to the immediate problem at hand, hoping to minimize con-
frontation and quietly persuade the resistant government that the assistance in 
question was a minor, unthreatening matter. Small private funders were hesi-
tant about bringing their own government into the discussions, fearing that 
such escalation would only alarm the host government and complicate things 
further. This was especially true with U.S. private funders that sometimes wor-
ried that U.S. government involvement would bring with it political baggage 
that would complicate their situation rather than improve it.
Campaigns to Block Restrictive Legislation
As noted in Closing Space, campaigns aimed at stopping governments from 
enacting restrictions on foreign funding for NGOs—restrictions that are often 
part of larger thrusts to constrain civil society space—are among the most 
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organized and assertive efforts to push back against closing space moves. The 
best of these campaigns combine a coordinated international effort to exert 
pressure against the government considering restrictive legislation with paral-
lel efforts by a diverse domestic coalition of civil society actors. Having been 
involved in a number of these sorts of campaigns, the assistance community 
is starting to accumulate and internalize some of the lessons from them. For 
example, a new “Defending Civil Society Toolkit”—an online resource cre-
ated by the World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the National 
Endowment for Democracy and the International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law—provides ideas and strategies for activists interested in engaging in NGO 
law reform processes.51 
The case of Kenya presents an example of an especially vigorous and suc-
cessful domestic NGO effort (with some complementary international efforts) 
to resist problematic legislation. Shortly after President Uhuru Kenyatta took 
power in April 2013, the Kenyan government tried to pass an amendments 
bill to the Public Benefits Organizations Act that would have capped foreign 
funds to NGOs at a maximum of 15 percent of an organization’s budget.52 The 
CSO Reference Group, a diverse coalition of Kenyan NGOs that had formed 
in 2010 to articulate the interests of Kenyan NGOs, led domestic efforts to 
counter the restrictions. They utilized demonstrations, public relations cam-
paigns, lobbying with individual members of parliament, and other methods. 
The coalition put Kenyan humanitarian NGOs in a prominent role, highlight-
ing to government officials the serious damage that would occur to Kenyans in 
areas of health, food, and shelter if the bill passed. Kenyan and international 
observers believe that the participation of Kenyan humanitarian and develop-
mental NGOs, rather than just the narrower circle of human rights organiza-
tions, was crucial to the campaign’s success.
On the other side of the ledger, the decision by the Cambodian govern-
ment to go ahead in mid-2015 with restrictive legislation relating to civil soci-
ety highlights the fact that even governments that receive large amounts of 
Western assistance are sometimes willing to defy well-organized, assertive 
efforts by donor governments and local civil society groups to oppose restric-
tive legislation.
The success of the Kenyan case has stimulated interest among some funders 
in expanding support to national NGO coalitions, or NGO platforms as they 
are sometimes called, as a way to strengthen local efforts to resist closing space. 
The European Union, for example, is preparing to establish a significant line of 
funding for NGO platforms in developing countries. Over 60 NGO platforms 
around the world are members of the International Forum of National NGO 
Platforms, which was established in 2008.53 Although NGO platforms can 
be a useful area for funding, caution needs to accompany such efforts. Such 
platforms vary in their aims and their relationships with their countries’ gov-
ernments, with some being more independent than others. Consequently, their 
willingness to take on closing space issues varies as well. In addition, sudden 
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increases in the level of foreign funding for a national NGO platform can risk 
exacerbating accusations of NGOs as agents of foreign influence.
Engaging the FATF: In the last two years, some assistance and policy groups 
concerned with the closing space problem have been acting on the fact that 
spillover from counterterrorism policies in many countries has been contribut-
ing to the closing space problem. In particular, they have been giving attention 
to the unhelpful role that the Financial Action Task Force has been playing: 
in service of the counterterrorism imperative, the FATF 
has sometimes encouraged national legislation that signifi-
cantly restricts external funding for civil society organiza-
tions and space for civil society generally. A coalition of 
transnational NGOs came together in 2014 to engage the 
FATF and voice concerns about the negative effects on civil 
society space of counterterrorism policies and laws and to 
look for better ways to balance the imperatives of secu-
rity and openness in the counterterrorism domain.54 The 
coalition weighed in, for example, with comments on a draft “Best Practices 
Paper” by the FATF on its Recommendation 8, which concerns combating the 
potential abuse of nonprofit organizations for terrorist financing purposes.55 
The comments led to improved FATF guidance to governments and an agree-
ment to enter into an annual FATF consultation with representatives of the 
not-for-profit sector.
This engagement represents a positive step, though only a start. The FATF 
still operates largely in the dark, with little public attention to its actions. More 
generally, the challenges for civil society emanating from the counterterrorism 
policy domain remain serious. The tendency of the antiterrorism imperative 
in countless national contexts to result in measures damaging to freedom of 
association and movement, and other basic rights essential for the operation 
of independent civil society, is an almost primal force. This is especially true 
given the continued multiplication of sources of terrorism and deep concerns 
about the issue in almost every region. Sometimes, of course, clashes between 
counterterrorism measures and space for civil society occur when governments 
are sincere about their counterterrorism actions but fail to strike a balance with 
other priorities. Yet other times, governments cynically use security rationales 
to justify measures whose core intention is the suppression of space for inde-
pendent political and civic actors.
Engaging with multilateral organizations: Looking for support from different 
multilateral organizations has been a further element of policy pushback on 
closing space issues. For example, technical and financial support to the UN 
special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of associa-
tion, Maina Kiai, has helped him draw attention to civil society restrictions by 
different governments, through fact-finding visits, reports, and urgent appeals. 
A coalition of transnational NGOs came together 
in 2014 to engage the FATF and voice concerns 
about the negative effects on civil society 
space of counterterrorism policies and laws. 
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In the past two years, some concerned aid providers have looked for additional 
ways to engage multilateral organizations on closing space issues. Norwegian 
government support has made possible strategic litigation on the part of the 
UN special rapporteur challenging restrictive legislation by national govern-
ments, such as in the case of Bolivia.56 In cooperation with the Community of 
Democracies, the special rapporteur started in mid-2014 carrying out a series 
of regional dialogues among civic activists and government representatives on 
the challenges that civil society organizations face in accessing resources.57
Various public and private actors have been pushing the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP) to engage on closing space issues. In September 2014, the 
OGP Steering Committee adopted a new “OGP Response Policy” for dealing 
with concerns raised to the OGP about civic space in countries participating in 
the OGP. One of the ways that concerns can be brought to the OGP is through 
a letter of concern from a civil society organization engaged with the OGP at 
the national or international level. The first such letter was submitted by three 
transnational NGOs in March 2015 about the policies of the government of 
Azerbaijan relating to civil society space, including restrictions on the operations 
of foreign funders. In May 2015, the OGP announced that it had prepared a 
report on Azerbaijan that confirmed the issues set forward in the letter of con-
cern. Four Hungarian and transnational rights groups submitted a second letter 
of concern to the OGP in June 2015 regarding the deterioration of civic space in 
Hungary.58 It is not yet clear what will be the effects of negative findings by the 
OGP in such cases on the behavior of the offending governments.
Engaging with international business: Some aid groups concerned with the clos-
ing space problem are exploring how to make common cause on these issues 
with international businesses operating in countries that are creating restric-
tive environments for civil society. The larger endeavor by the human rights 
community to get business to join the cause on human rights issues has been 
a long and difficult road. The hope is that the foreign funding issue may be a 
more direct hook—business associations, which often receive foreign funding 
from Western sources, will also be affected by some NGO funding restric-
tions. According to the New York Times, over 40 American trade associations 
and lobby groups in China, including the American Chamber of Commerce, 
have written to the National People’s Congress complaining that the law could 
affect their activities and “ability to effectively operate and contribute to China’s 
economy and consequently hinder China’s economic development.”59 Yet, as 
reported in a story by Reuters on engagement by Western business in lobbying 
the Chinese government on the proposed law, “An abnormally high number of 
people [in the foreign business community in China] are worried about blow-
back. People are saying we have to be careful not to rile up the beast.”60 
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Strengthening the Response 
Looking at all these different lines of response, one can see that many aid pro-
viders are stepping up their reactions to the closing space problem and engag-
ing on multiple levels.
They are changing how they operate:
• Giving greater recognition to the problem and engaging in more knowl-
edge-sharing activities relating to it
• Operating remotely when necessary
• Developing sharper communication strategies
• Engaging in greater risk analysis
• Attempting to increase cooperation with local funding partners
They are changing what they do:
• Scaling back to avoid triggering local sensitivities
• Increasing availability of emergency funds for grantees in trouble
• Expanding protective assistance
• Searching for alternative ways to support civil society
They are increasing efforts to head off or limit closing space actions:
• Pushing back against specific restrictive measures
• Mounting campaigns to block or modify problematic new NGO laws
• Engaging with the FATF to reduce conflicts between counterterrorism 
policies and civic openness
• Bolstering engagement by multilateral organizations 
• Exploring new partnerships with international business actors
Many of these lines of response still have only a preliminary quality. Much 
remains to be done to take them forward. None represents any kind of magic 
bullet. The multiplicity of lines of response necessarily reflects the complexity 
and depth of the problem. A lack of in-depth research and strong empirical 
foundation on this issue hobbles the advance of some of these areas of response. 
There is a need, for example, for greater learning relating to the experience of 
campaigns to block restrictive legislation. The search for alternative forms of 
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supporting civil society requires additional research on the changing nature 
of civil society in many countries, public attitudes and understanding of civic 
activism, and the underlying structures of money and power that influence 
civil society development. 
Overall Weakness
Progress is being made in elaborating different lines of action relating to closing 
space problems, but the overall response is still not very strong. Only a small 
number of official donors, notably Canada, the European Union, Sweden, and 
the United States, have engaged significantly at the policy level or through 
major aid initiatives. Most other official donors have yet to come to grips with 
the issue. 
To the extent donor governments are engaging, it is usually only in relatively 
limited ways. Closing space competes for attention with many international 
issues of intense concern in Western policy circles, whether 
it is the Islamic State, swelling flows of refugees from the 
Middle East and Africa, or the Ukraine crisis. The relatively 
low position of the closing space problem on the Western 
policy agenda contrasts with the fact that many closing space 
governments view bringing civil society to heel and reining 
in its foreign funding as an issue of high, even existential 
importance. Thus, governments responding to the problem are almost always less 
motivated and less engaged than those creating the problem. Moreover, when 
donor governments take up the issue they usually do so through their foreign 
ministries and aid agencies. Yet their policy engagement needs the close coopera-
tion of other ministries—such as defense, treasury, and justice or home affairs—
that have substantial bearing on relevant policies. A lack of intergovernmental 
coordination often weakens the policy response.
Conflicting policy interests also undercut donor responses. The perceived 
need to accommodate many of the governments in Africa, the Middle East, 
Asia, and elsewhere that are asserting closing space policies—whether for 
the sake of shared counterterrorism concerns, for access to energy sources, or 
to advance trade and financial interests—only continues to increase for the 
United States and many other Western governments. U.S. President Barack 
Obama’s visit to Ethiopia in July 2015 was only one recent example of this 
larger reality. Ethiopia is a poster child in Africa for terrible civil society poli-
cies—especially concerning foreign funding for domestic NGOs. Yet in Addis 
Ababa, President Obama expressed only mild statements of concern to his 
hosts and twice referred to Ethiopia’s authoritarian government as “democrati-
cally elected.”61
Similarly, on the private side of assistance, only a small number of major 
aid providers are investing significantly in trying to find ways to craft broader 
policy responses. Most private funders have stayed focused on trying to work 
Progress is being made in elaborating different 
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out their own specific problems with particular governments. Especially with 
small private funders, this is often a result of a feeling of being minor players 
with no significant role to play in larger policy frameworks. In other cases, 
some private funders simply prefer to keep their profiles low and not be associ-
ated with more visible policy stances on this issue.
Divisions
The overall response to the closing space issue is also weakened by divisions 
within the international assistance community regarding what the problem 
really is and how best to respond. At least four major divisions undercut efforts 
to forge coordinated larger responses:
U.S. versus European perspectives: When the closing space phenomenon first 
started to make itself strongly felt in the middle years of last decade, many 
European funders saw it as a U.S. problem, one primarily affecting U.S. 
democracy groups. To the extent they experienced it directly, they believed it 
to be caused by what Europeans thought was a too politically confrontational 
U.S. approach to supporting democracy and human rights in other countries. 
As the trend has spread, this division has lessened somewhat. Many more 
European groups are being targeted, sometimes together with U.S. groups, 
such as in India recently, but also sometimes on their own, such as Norway 
by Hungary in 2014. More often than before, European and U.S. funders are 
consulting with each other, formally and informally, on closing space issues.62 
Yet divisions persist that militate against fully joined-up policy responses. 
First, the long-standing difference between European and U.S. actors over 
how best to react to problematic governments—especially a different philoso-
phy over the value of public naming and shaming versus quiet diplomacy—
affects this domain. Many European actors remain more inclined than many 
Americans toward softer approaches, believing that this can keep doors open in 
some cases. They point to the fact that European groups are still able to operate 
in some places where American groups have been chased out. In Russia, for 
example, USAID was asked to leave, but the European Union continues to do 
democracy-related funding; the U.S. party institutes are gone, but the German 
political foundations are still there. Likewise, long after the U.S. party institutes 
have been banished from Egypt, some European party foundations still work 
in the country training Egyptian political parties. Second, despite Europeans 
being directly hit by closing space measures, some Europeans continue to see 
this problem as rooted in reactions to a geostrategically assertive United States 
and remain wary of being closely associated with policy responses in which the 
United States has a major role.
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Private versus public: Private funders experiencing closing space problems are 
sometimes reluctant to work closely with their own governments to forge a 
broader common policy response. They are wary of the mixed interests that 
their governments often have in aid-receiving countries, and the baggage that 
they believe may accompany any governmental involvement in the issue. This 
ambivalence is especially strong within the U.S. private funding community, 
given the effects of the U.S. geostrategic overhang on U.S. policies relating to 
democracy and human rights.
Developmental versus political: Developmentally oriented funders—which 
in the civil society domain usually support groups engaged in local service 
delivery and other socioeconomic tasks—are often wary of joining up on 
closing space responses with more politically oriented funders, such as those 
that support human rights groups and NGOs focused on democracy issues, 
like parliamentary transparency, election monitoring, and civic education. 
Developmentalists worry that their work will suffer by direct association with 
more political actors, and sometimes feel that it is the political side of the civil 
society assistance domain that has caused the closing space problem. Yet with 
an increasing number of development aid groups experiencing negative actions 
from host governments—such as Mercy Corps and Cordaid being put on the 
Indian government’s watch list and Save the Children encountering problems 
in Pakistan—this view is changing, at least partially.63 A recent report issued 
by two networks of development and humanitarian organizations, Act Alliance 
and CIDSE (Together for Global Justice), presents the results of extensive sur-
veys of representatives of local development NGOs in four countries undergo-
ing closing space and analyzes how to strengthen responses to the problem.64 
The human rights community sometimes exacerbates the division. It does so 
by talking about closing space as an issue that is really all about the human 
rights community and not taking account of the developmental side of the 
picture. The transparency community, at times, does the same.
Us versus them: One further division within the assistance community under-
cuts efforts to forge more coordinated policy responses. It is a division existing 
as much within funders as between them. Some aid practitioners believe that 
a considerable part of the closing space problem is the fault of the assistance 
community itself. In this view, Western civil society assistance, especially as 
practiced by large official aid providers, has brought the problem of closing 
space on itself by persistently funding professionalized NGOs that are good 
at carrying out donor agendas, but bad at developing local support and legiti-
macy. According to this line of thinking, overcoming the closing space prob-
lem will only come about by significantly revising or abandoning this model 
of civil society assistance. Other aid practitioners see this outlook as a case of 
“blaming the victim.” They feel that while civil society assistance should cer-
tainly strive to encourage partners and grantees to pursue local agendas and 
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cultivate local support, the core problem is the intolerance of many govern-
ments around the world for independent civil society itself, not a problem with 
which civil society groups are funded.
Governments engaged in squeezing out foreign actors are masters of 
exploiting these various divisions to undercut coordinated reactions to their 
moves. Therefore, finding ways to mediate and lessen these divisions is cru-
cial to mounting more effective, coordinated responses to the closing space 
problem. This will require greater efforts to build lines of communication and 
knowledge-sharing across diverse parts of the assistance community that have 
traditionally preferred to live and work within their own subcommunities. In 
this way, the closing space challenge translates into a fundamental challenge 
of community building: Can a diverse set of international actors that have 
long been a community mostly just in name bridge differences of outlook and 
method and become a real community in practice? 
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